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Abstract: The paper tries to demonstrate that the process of the increase of entropy does not explain
the asymmetry of time itself because it is unable to account for its fundamental asymmetries, that
is, the asymmetry of traces (we have traces of the past and no traces of the future), the asymmetry
of causation (we have an impact on future events with no possibility of having an impact on the
past), and the asymmetry between the fixed past and the open future, To this end, the approaches of
Boltzmann, Reichenbach (and his followers), and Albert are analysed. It is argued that we should
look for alternative approaches instead of this, namely we should consider a temporally asymmetrical
physical theory or seek a source of the asymmetry of time in metaphysics. This second approach may
even turn out to be complementary if only we accept that metaphysics can complement scientific
research programmes.
Keywords: asymmetry of time; asymmetry in time; direction of time; entropy; Boltzmann; Reichen-
bach; David Z. Albert
1. Introduction: The Asymmetry of Time and the Asymmetry in Time
One of the most fundamental features of our world is that it is strongly temporally
asymmetrical: as our experience shows, we have traces of the past in our memory and
around us and no traces of the future; we can have an impact on future events with
no possibility of having such an impact on the past; meanwhile, the future seems to be
open, while the past is fixed and cannot be changed. The problem of the direction or the
asymmetry of time itself consists in answering the question of whether the world is truly
temporally asymmetrical and in finding an explanation of what is responsible for this
asymmetry (Some philosophers, such as Mehlberg [1], Horwich [2], and Huw Price claim
that the world is temporally symmetrical due to the temporal symmetry of fundamental
physical interactions; according to them, an alleged temporal asymmetry is a product of
our awareness. Adherents of such a view should explain where such an illusion comes
from: a far from easy task which I will show by means of the example of Price in the third
section of this paper).
Two clarification are needed here: firstly, after Sklar [3–6], I distinguish between the
asymmetry of time and asymmetry in time. That the causation is future directed and we
find only traces of the past but can affect only the future, and that the past cannot be
changed while the future can be, seem to be essential features of time itself, and not this
or any other particular process occurring in time. Like many others, I eat my dessert after
my main courses and go to bed after sunset, but these temporally asymmetrical processes
do not constitute the asymmetry of time itself; they are only some processes which are
asymmetrical in time and tell us nothing about time itself.
In contrast to such processes which are asymmetrical in time, the three features
mentioned in the beginning seem to constitute essential features of time itself and require
explanation. This is a second point which I feel it is important to emphasise. The asymmetry
of time constituted by these three asymmetries is fundamental for us and every explanation
of the directionality of time since Boltzmann’s Lectures on Gas Theory [7] (Boltzmann [7].
See also Sklar [3,4,6]; and Gołosz [8–10]) has stemmed from our attempts to understand
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these asymmetries, and that is why every plausible theory of the direction of time should
explain them in a credible way.
What do I mean by plausible explanation? We have perfect examples of such ex-
planations in physics: we are able to explain that light is an electromagnetic wave and
what constitutes the difference between “up” and “down” are gravitational forces (or the
structure of spacetime in the general theory of relativity (GTR)). That we can try to explain
the direction of time in a similar way to the fact that the difference between “up” and
“down” is explained by gravitational forces was suggested by Boltzmann himself [7], as I
will recall in the next section.
We believe in physics and that it should explain all of the essential characteristics of the
world and the three fundamental asymmetrical features of the world as well. Unfortunately,
it transpires that fundamental interactions, that is, strong, electromagnetic and gravitational
interactions, are time reversal invariant and as such they cannot explain these asymmetries.
Although weak interactions are not time reversal invariant, they are unable to explain this
asymmetry as well because of two reasons:
(1) they do not take part in everyday processes which are temporally asymmetrical, when
we are, for example, writing, reading, or doing some task [3,6,11];
(2) weak interactions are only feebly temporally asymmetrical, that is, for any weak
process, a time-reversed sequence of time-reversed states is possible, although it can
have a different probability, while time is strongly temporally asymmetrical, that is
we have no cases of backward causations, no traces of the past and no possibility of
influencing the past [8–10,12].
That is why weak interactions are unable to ground and explain the asymmetry of
time and the processes involving weak interactions should be qualified as only processes
which are asymmetrical in time.
Although the laws of physics do not provide us with enough temporal asymmetry,
one could insist that we have enough asymmetry in the world as it is described by physics
to explain the asymmetry of time after all: if not in physical laws than perhaps we should
look for the direction of time in temporary asymmetrical processes de facto. Of course, the
process of the increase of entropy has been the most plausible candidate for any explanation
of the direction of time since the second half of the 19th century (Whenever the term entropy
is employed in this paper, it should be read in the sense of Boltzmann’s understanding of
entropy). Contrary to this, using different examples in the second section of this paper, I
would like to show that despite these high hopes, the process of the increase of entropy
is unfortunately not up to the task, that is, it explains none of the three abovementioned
temporal asymmetries. This will be demonstrated by means of the well-known examples
from Boltzmann, Reichenbach (and his followers), and Albert, namely that the increase of
entropy is unable to explain the asymmetry of traces, the asymmetry of causation, and the
asymmetry between the fixed past and the open future, and it should only be treated as a
process that is asymmetrical in time.
2. The Increase of Entropy as a Process Asymmetrical in Time
As is well-known, Boltzmann hoped that the process of the increase of entropy would
explain the manner in which we experience the direction of time in precisely the same
manner that gravity explains the difference between the directions of up and down:
“One can think of the world as a mechanical system of an enormously large number of
constituents, and of an immensely long period of time, so that the dimensions of that part
containing our own “fixed stars” are minute compared to the extension of the universe;
and times that we call eons are likewise minute compared to such a period. Then in
the universe, which is in thermal equilibrium throughout and therefore dead, there will
occur here and there relatively small regions of the same size as our galaxy (we call them
single worlds) which, during the relative short time of eons, fluctuate noticeably from
thermal equilibrium, and indeed the state probability in such cases will be equally likely
to increase or decrease. For the universe, the two directions of time are indistinguishable,
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just as in space there is no up or down. However, just as at a particular place on the
earth’s surface we call “down” the direction toward the centre of the earth, so will a living
being in a particular time interval of such a single world distinguish the direction of time
toward the less probable state from the opposite direction (the former toward the past, the
latter toward the future). By virtue of this terminology, such small, isolated regions of
the universe will always find themselves “initially” in an improbable state. This method
seems to me to be the only way in which one can understand the second law—the heat
death of each single world—without a unidirectional change of the entire universe from a
definite initial state to a final state.” [7] (pp. 402–403)
What reduction does Boltzmann have in mind? Reduction by definition or scientific
reduction? One might speculate that he did not think about reduction by definition because
in such a case—as noticed by Eddington [13] (p. 93)—the second law of thermodynamics
became an analytic truth which is always truly independent of the real course of processes
in the world. I do not suppose that Boltzmann wanted to transform the second law of
thermodynamics into a tautology.
Yet if he had in mind scientific reduction, then—as noticed by Sklar [3] (chapter V)—he
should explain why we have traces of the past and no traces of the future; why we can have
an impact on future events with no possibility of having an impact on the past; and why
the future seems to be open, while the past is fixed and cannot be changed in a similar way
as we explain the difference between “up” and “down” with the aid of gravitational forces.
Unfortunately, he did not do so and I will show later that the attempts of Reichenbach and
his followers to explain the asymmetry of our knowledge concerning the past and future,
that is, the first asymmetry, failed as well.
What is more, when we assess Boltzmann’s attempt to explain the asymmetry of
time, we should take into account the real status of the second law of thermodynamics
and the temporal symmetry of statistical mechanics (SM). This latter says—as noticed by
Boltzmann—that the entropy of a physical system which is in a state of thermal equilibrium
can spontaneously fluctuate to more ordered states and that physical systems that are not
initially in a state of thermal equilibrium will evolve with a great probability to more
probable states, that is, to states with greater entropy. Such a theory takes for granted
the dynamical evolution of physical systems and the flow of time: in the course of the
flowing of time, the systems can fluctuate, firstly decreasing and then increasing its entropy.
Yet this means that we assume the existence of the flow of time and, in consequence,
the existence of an objective arrow of time connected with the passage of time which is
not explained by Boltzmann’s reduction and makes his reduction redundant. In turn, if
we do not assume a dynamical evolution of physical systems based on the flow of time,
Boltzmann’s magnificent explanation of the statistical behaviour of these systems with the
aid of occurring spontaneous fluctuations becomes incomprehensible.
I have critically analysed Boltzmann’s approach to the arrow of time. For philosophers,
the attempts of Reichenbach [14], and his followers (particularly Smart [15] and Grün-
baum [16]) are perhaps better known. According to the approach initiated by Reichenbach,
if we find some traces of the past, such as footprint shaped marks on the beach, we can infer
from this that “at some earlier time an interaction took place, that a person‘s steps caused
the ordered state of the sand” [14] (p. 151) because “this orderliness is bought at the expense
of an increased disorderliness (metabolic depletion) of the pedestrian who made it” [15]
(p. 469) or—using Grünbaum’s words—“we can reliably infer a past interaction of the
system with an outside agency from a present ordered or low entropy state” [16] (p. 235).
However, as highlighted by Earman [17], we do not have to appeal to entropy consid-
erations to infer our knowledge about the past from traces: traces give us much more infor-
mation which is more precise than that which would follow from entropy considerations—
these, at best, would only say about the past interaction of the system whose entropy is
lower than it should be with some external system so as to produce a greater order of
the sand (See [17] (pp. 43–45)). Secondly, it can be seen from the above citations (from
Reichenbach, Grünbaum, and Smart) that an assumption about some asymmetric causal
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interaction is involved in every such inference, which means that this inference is in fact
based on temporal asymmetric causation (See [17] (pp. 41–42)), and since causal theories of
time direction have failed (as noticed below), this reasoning also fails. Thirdly, there are
well known cases—for example, when a bomb is dropped on a city—when the formation
of subsystems of temporarily higher entropy than their surroundings form traces which
are easily readable for us (See [17] (p. 40)). All this shows that the entropic approach
to the asymmetry of our knowledge adopted by Reichenbach, Smart, and Grünbaum is
unsuccessful; we have to appeal to the asymmetry of causation and apply a causal theory
of time to explain the asymmetry of our memory but this approach does not work.
This is perhaps not the best place for a critique of causal theories of time direction,
I would like only to note that it is reasonable to assume that physical interactions are
involved in all causal relations and because strong, electromagnetic and gravitational
interactions are time reversal invariant, the causal theories of time are unable to distinguish
between the past and the future [3,8,9].
As a response to such objections, one might try to apply the strategy of biting the
bullet and assume that causal relations are reduced to thermodynamic processes as well.
A prominent adherent of such an approach is David Albert (See Albert [18]. See also
Loewer [19] and Frisch [20]. Albert did not analyze Earman’s critique of entropic approach
in his book). Albert claimed that causal asymmetry is grounded in the same processes that
give rise to the second law of thermodynamics, first of all in a low-entropy constraint on
the initial state of the universe, which is known as the Past Hypothesis (PH) According to the
PH, “the world first came into being in whatever particular low-entropy highly condensed
big-bang sort of macrocondition it is that the normal inferential procedures of cosmology
will eventually present to us”. [18] (p. 96).
Generally speaking, David Albert claims that according to SM and PH, possible
macroevolutions are much more restricted toward the past than toward the future and this
is responsible for the temporal directedness of our own capacity to acquire information about
the world and to influence causally the occurrence of future events but not past events [18]
(p. X, chapter 6). To understand the problem of how PH works, we should—according
to Albert—focus our attention on macro events such as billiard ball collisions in a given
collection which behave—Albert claims—in a temporally asymmetrical way:
“Think (to begin with) of the collection of billiard balls we were talking about before.
Suppose that some particular one of those balls (ball number 5, say) is currently stationary.
Then suppose (and this is what is going to stand out—in the context of this extremely
simple example—for a past hypothesis) that that same ball is somehow known to have
been moving ten seconds ago.” [18] (p. 126)
It follows from the laws of mechanics that ball 5, which is currently stationary but on
Albert’s assumption was moving ten seconds ago, had to have been involved in a collision
in the past 10 s. On these assumptions, he claims ([18] (pp. 126–128)), that whereas, on
the one hand, there are obviously any number of hypothetical alterations of the present
condition of the balls in the set which would alter the facts about whether ball number 5
is to be involved in a collision over the next ten seconds or not, there can be, on the other
hand, no hypothetical alterations in the present condition of this set of balls, unless they
involve hypothetical alterations in the present velocity of ball number 5 itself, which would
alter the facts about whether or not ball number 5 had been involved in a collision over
the past ten seconds. That is why “there are (as it were) a far wider variety of potentially
available routes to influence over the future of the ball in question here, there are a far wider
variety of what we might call causal handles on the future of the ball in question here, under
these circumstances, than there are on its past” [18] (p. 128).
Here—and which is important—“under these circumstances” means that it is taken for
granted that ball 5 is somehow known to have been moving ten seconds ago [18] (pp. 126–128).
In this example, the condition that ball 5 was moving ten seconds ago plays the role of a
PH while—as Albert emphasizes—we do not have its counterpart concerning the future.
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Now, the important question arises as to whether Albert managed to explain the
asymmetry of time, that is, the asymmetry of how we acquire information about the world
and the asymmetry of how we influence causally the occurrence of future events but not of
past events. Unfortunately, the answer must be in the negative: assuming that ball 5 in
his example is somehow known to have been moving ten seconds ago while not assuming a
symmetrical postulation concerning the future, Albert introduced the temporal asymmetry
into the process analysed in his argument instead of explaining it. More specifically, he
assumed the fundamental asymmetry between the fixed past and the open future, that
is, this very asymmetry which he should explain and in this way his reasoning begs the
question. This mistake is even more perplexing if one takes into account the fact that
Albert begins his book with the strong declaration that “[t]his book is intended both as an
elementary introduction and as an original contribution to the development of a scientific
account of the distinction between the past and the future” (Albert [18] (p. viii). Hemmo
and Shenker [21] also claim, as does the author of this paper [8–10], that the second law of
thermodynamics and the past hypothesis in statistical mechanics cannot yield arrows of
time since the second law of thermodynamics and PH already assume an arrow of time).
Another fundamental objection can be raised against Albert’s approach and all those
that try to reduce the asymmetry of our knowledge and asymmetry of causation to the
second law of thermodynamics. Namely, according to SM, it is possible in every physical
system during some period of time that entropy will be constant or even decrease as an
effect of thermodynamic fluctuations. Should we then believe that causal relations in
the first case will be temporally symmetric and—in the second one—change its temporal
direction? Should we believe that our knowledge concerning the past and the future in the
first case becomes temporally symmetric?
In turn, Frisch [20] (Section 3) highlights the obvious fact that thermodynamic asym-
metry often results in the destruction of records or traces of the past and there are many
“human-scale” macroevents that leave no or only very few traces in their futures. If, for
example, the wind wipes out the footprint-like traces in the sand and traces of ancient
civilizations have vanished under layers of sand and soil, it can be argued that one central
role played by the thermodynamic arrow is as a destroyer of macrorecords and macrotraces
rather than as their creator. In consequence, we cannot treat the increase of entropy as
being responsible for the fact that we have traces of the past and no traces of the future.
Frisch [20] (Section 3) also criticizes Albert’s claim that, according to SM and PH,
possible macroevolutions are much more restricted toward the past than toward the future,
that is—in Loewer’s [19] terminology—the claim that a possible macroevolution has a
“tree structure”. Frisch indicates that, while there really is a macrobranching of many
physical systems toward the future, thermodynamic considerations imply that there is
also a possible widespread reconvergence of possible macrohistories. For example, at
the cosmological level, even though the initial state of the universe might not determine
the large-scale distribution of matter, different cosmological macrohistories will converge
toward the final equilibrium state. Similarly, Frisch shows that there is a convergence
at the level of “human-sized” macrosystems: for example, in the paradigmatic case of a
container half filled with gas, no matter which part of the container the body of gas initially
occupies, the gas will spread after the partition is removed until it is uniformly distributed
throughout the whole container. All this suggests that possible macroevolutions may
exhibit an upside-down tree structure.
3. Final Remarks
I have tried to show that the thermodynamic explanation of the asymmetry of time is
implausible because the process of the increase of entropy does not explain why we have
traces of the past in our memory and around us and no traces of the future; why we can
have an impact on future events with no possibility of having an impact on the past; and
why the future seems to be open, while the past is fixed and cannot be changed. Thus, if
I am right in adopting this line of argumentation, one can conclude that the increase of
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entropy as it is described by the second law of thermodynamics is only a process which is
asymmetrical in time and in no way helps us to explain the asymmetry of time itself.
Perhaps, in such a situation where the strong, electromagnetic and gravitational
interactions are time reversal invariant and the increase of entropy does not explain the
asymmetry of time, we should maintain that time has no direction and following Price [22],
for example, assume that this essential component of temporal asymmetry, namely causal
asymmetry, reflects an asymmetry in us rather than an asymmetry in the external world.
He suggested that causal asymmetry may be conventional, or perspectival, that is, not
an objective aspect of the world, but a kind of projection of our own internal temporal
asymmetry as agents who act in the world with the thermodynamic gradient:
“From an objective standpoint, very crudely, an agent is simply a natural system which
correlates inputs with outputs. The inputs are environmental data and the outputs are
behavior. The details of these correlations vary with the agent’s internal state, and this
too may vary in response to inputs. The terms “input” and “output” assume a temporal
direction, of course, but this is inessential. From an atemporal viewpoint what matters is
that events on one temporal side of the box get correlated with events on the other side. It
does not matter that one side is thought of as earlier and the other later. From a sufficiently
detached perspective, then, deliberation appears broadly symmetric in time—an agent
is simply a “black box” which mediates some otherwise unlikely correlations of this
kind. Certainly, the operations of working models may depend on temporal asymmetry,
in the way that actual agents require the thermodynamic gradient, but it is possible to
characterize what such a system does, at least in these very crude black box terms, without
specifying a temporal direction.” [22] (p. 168)
Is it really a plausible solution? I do not believe so. Let us consider Price as an
agent who is writing his book [22]—this is our “black box”—from an atemporal point of
view, which is preferred by him (see [8] (p. 180)). Then, on one temporal side of the box,
we receive Price, who is collecting more and more material for his book and analysing
it. On the other side, however, we receive the book and philosophers who are reading
it. Yet why do we have traces of Price’s work and rising traces of the reading of it (for
example, in the form of a growing number of citations) on only one temporal side? The
thermodynamic gradient, as I have shown in the former section, does not explain the
asymmetry of traces and Price, unfortunately, does not add anything new to this subject.
We are also left in the dark as to why Price is only able to answer objections raised to his
arguments on one temporal side of “black box”, that is precisely the one which is later.
Therefore, unfortunately, Price’s solution appears to be highly implausible.
Thus, it seems that the idea that time has no direction is a far from tempting one. Now,
however, an important question arises: if time really is asymmetric, how can we explain
such a fundamental property of our world which is the asymmetry of time? I suggested
in my former paper [10] that there are two possible ways we can look for solutions to this
conundrum: the first is that the future quantum gravity which we are looking for will be a
time-asymmetric theory and perhaps such a theory would be able to explain the asymmetry
of time. The second possibility is that we should seek the origin of the asymmetry of time
in metaphysics rather than in physics.
Thus, Penrose [23] (pp. 345, 350–353) suggests that our sought-for quantum gravity
must be a time-asymmetric theory. To the possible objection that his postulated theory
should correspond to GTR in the “classical” level and GTR is itself time-symmetric, Penrose
replies that although the separation between dynamical equations and initial (or boundary)
conditions has historically been of vital importance, his sought-for theory should dissolve
away this separation. That is, he suggests that future quantum gravity should absorb PH
into its main body in some way, and should not treat it as something external. Such a move
would, of course, be at odds with our present methodological rules as they have been
assumed since Newton but—as was noticed by Laudan [24]—the methodological rules
can change when science develops and new theories are created, so nobody can a priori
exclude Penrose’s proposal as implausible.
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The second—metaphysical—approach to the asymmetry of time was developed by
the author of this paper [8,12,25–27]. According to this approach, temporal asymmetry
is introduced into our world by the way it exists, that is, by dynamic existence, which is a
generalisation of the notion of becoming. That we should include becoming into our image
of the world has been advocated by, inter alia, Ellis [28], Smolin [29], and Rovelli [30].
Rovelli, for example, wrote:
“Physics (if not science in general) is a theory about how things happen. Its core, since
ancient astronomy, Galileo, Kepler and Newton, all the way to quantum field theory
and general relativity, is the description of motion, evolution, change, becoming.” [30]
(p. 1331)
In turn, Smolin adds a number of interesting remarks:
“If space is emergent, does that mean that time is also emergent? If we go deep enough
into the fundamentals of nature, does time disappear? In the last century, we have
progressed to the point where many of my colleagues consider time to be emergent from a
more fundamental description of nature in which time does not appear.
I believe—as strongly as one can believe anything in science—that they are wrong. Time
will turn out to be the only aspect of our everyday experience that is fundamental. The
fact that it is always some moment in our perception, and that we experience that moment
as one of a flow of moments, is not an illusion. It is the best clue we have to fundamental
reality.” [29] (p. xxxi)
“We have to find a way to unfreeze time—to represent time without turning it into space.
I have no idea how to do this. I cannot conceive of a mathematics that doesn’t represent a
world as if it were frozen in eternity.” [29] (p. 257)
If mathematics tends to represent a world as if it were frozen in eternity, it is a strong
indication, I think, that we should look for our solution to unfreezing time elsewhere. My
choice is metaphysics: the main thesis of my position, which is called dynamic presentism,
says that all of the objects that our world consists of, exist dynamically. The notion of dy-
namic existence is treated in my approach as a primitive one which is roughly characterised
by the following set of three postulates:
(i) the notion of dynamic existence is tensed;
(ii) things that dynamically exist endure;
(iii) events (which are acts of acquiring, losing, or changing properties by dynamically
existing things and their collections) dynamically exist in the sense of coming to pass
(See [12] (pp. 41–42) and [27] (Section 3). Things endure when they persist over time,
keeping their strict identity).
The first postulate means that we can say about what dynamically existed (the past),
what dynamically exist (the present), and what will dynamically exist (the future), that is, we
are able to differentiate between the past, the present, and the future.
Such a metaphysical theory introduces dynamics into the world and explains all of the
fundamental temporal asymmetries: firstly, the future is (or seems to be) open, while the
past is fixed because events, which are acts of acquiring, losing, or changing properties by
dynamically existing things and their collections, dynamically exist in the sense of coming
to pass. Secondly, the enduring things—one can say metaphorically—dynamically exist
toward the future carrying traces of the past interactions and thanks to this, in spite of
the symmetry under time reversal of physical interactions (modulo weak interactions, of
course), convey traces of the past into the future. Thirdly, and because of the same reason,
things can impact on future events with no possibility of having an impact on the past.
One can perhaps treat the fact that it is metaphysical and not physical as a draw-
back of this last explanation of asymmetry of time, and that it introduces a piece of hard
metaphysics into the heart of our knowledge about the physical world. I think, how-
ever, that such an objection would be too strong. Firstly, we know after the demise of
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logical positivism that metaphysical ideas can be introduced into scientific research pro-
grammes [31–33]. Secondly, it transpires that the situation is not so bad and that not only do
the two proposed approaches—the physical and the metaphysical—not contradict one an-
other, but even then, it can turn out that they are deeply complementary. Namely, in some
approaches to quantum gravity, for example, in causal dynamical triangulation [34–36],
temporal asymmetry and dynamics are strongly desired because their authors assume that
spacetime has a built-in arrow of time which is needed to distinguish between causes and
effects and in turn causal time-asymmetric processes are necessary to treat the spacetime
as emerging dynamically as a four-dimensional object. Unfortunately, the authors of this
approach do not explain the origin of dynamics and the asymmetry of causation, and thus
the kind of metaphysics introduced above, if added, can be treated as a source of both these
lacking components [10,12].
I think that it is by no means accidental that both the proposals for solving the problem
of the asymmetry of time introduced above introduce new methodological approaches: the
fact that we have so many doubts concerning such a fundamental property of our world
means that we do not understand it and perhaps we should change the way we think
about it. After all, former revolutions in physics—such as those connected with Newton,
Einstein, or quantum mechanics—involved essential changes in our thinking about science
itself [23,33], so we can expect that some changes will be necessary in the future as well.
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